

27 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Second Review of Document for Publication

1. At your request I have reviewed once again

[REDACTED]  
I have personally read the manuscript carefully and also I have given it to yet another senior officer for an independent view.

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2. The independent reader and I came to the same conclusions: this is a scholarly, almost dull recitation of the great policy struggle in Hanoi between emphasis on the war in the south and revolutionary progress in the north. It is almost entirely historical and at many points documentary. (This will be its merit for scholars--that is the use of North Vietnamese documents that were released to the public by Congress in May 1968.)

3. There are no contentious issues here that I can see--unless one includes the proposition that differences in opinion within the North Vietnamese leadership do indeed exist. I suppose it might be possible to argue that a reader anxious to find ammunition for use against the Agency could ask, "if CIA knew about such differences why did it not exploit them?" or "if CIA told the White House about these differences, couldn't such and such a policy leading to peace have been adopted as a result? Since no peace came, then CIA must not have told the White House about the split." Inventing such arguments to attach to this piece would be straining indeed.

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4. In fact I see no danger whatsoever in the article--possibly some gain for CIA in scholarly circles because of its objectivity and scrupulous sourcing. It will certainly not draw much attention [redacted] anyway.

5. One final recommendation plus a suggestion. I recommend the piece be published with pride. I suggest [redacted] be described as a Far Eastern expert in CIA who for some years was an analyst of Vietnamese affairs.

[redacted]  
E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.  
Director of Current Intelligence

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